Series B GTM Strategy · Revenue System Design · $10M–$50M ARR
You have capital, headcount, and a product that works. But the revenue system built on founder instinct and early relationships doesn't scale to 20 reps across three segments. Something has to be redesigned.
GTM-360 diagnoses what's breaking in post-Series B revenue systems — and rebuilds the parts that need to run without the founder in every deal.
Former AWS COO ($500M ARR scale) · Series B RevOps rebuild (+70% forecast accuracy) · 20+ years in B2B
Series B is not a bigger version of Series A. It is a fundamentally different operating challenge. The commercial model that worked at $5M–$8M ARR stops producing at $15M–$25M ARR — not because the team got worse, but because the system was never designed to scale.
The early customers that shaped your product roadmap look different from the buyers entering the pipeline today. Inbound has attracted adjacent personas. Partnerships brought in different verticals. The product evolved to serve use cases beyond the original design. Nobody updated the ICP definition. The sales team is now chasing buyers who take longer to close, churn faster, and generate more support tickets.
When the founder or VP of Sales is in every deal, stage criteria can be implicit — everyone knows what a real Commit looks like. At 15 reps across two segments, implicit stage criteria produce 15 different interpretations. The pipeline shows 4× coverage. Forecasts look solid. And then Q3 ends with a miss because half the Commit column was optimism, not evidence.
At Series A, the board accepted range estimates and founder judgment. At Series B, with institutional investors and a new CFO, the forecast needs to be a system — not a conversation. Volatility that was acceptable before is now a credibility problem. The fix requires rebuilding the underlying pipeline signal quality, not just improving the forecast call.
Early on, marketing and sales shared the same founders' understanding of who the customer was. As both teams grew independently, they optimised for different things. Marketing hit MQL targets. Sales said the leads were wrong. Customer success inherited accounts that sales should never have closed. The hand-off points became friction points — and nobody owns fixing them.
The sales motion works because three experienced AEs know how to navigate it intuitively. New hires take 6–9 months to ramp — twice as long as leadership expected — because the motion was never written down. Replication requires documentation. Documentation requires understanding what the motion actually is. Most Series B companies have never had to do this before.
The engagement structure is the same as all GTM-360 work — Diagnostic, Architecture, Engineering — but the emphasis at Series B is typically on the first two phases.
10–14 days · standalone
At Series B specifically, the diagnostic looks for: which ICP segments have the highest win rates and NRR vs. which segments are filling the pipeline; whether stage definitions mean the same thing to every rep; how the forecast is being built and where it is consistently wrong; where the marketing-to-sales handoff is breaking; and whether the revenue motion is documented enough to be replicable.
3–6 weeks
The design phase at Series B usually covers at minimum: ICP redefinition grounded in current win rate and retention data; stage redesign with buyer-evidence criteria that can be enforced consistently; a forecasting governance model; and a documented revenue motion that new hires can learn from. Often also includes GTM alignment between marketing, sales, and CS on shared definitions and metrics.
6–16 weeks
Implementation with specialists: CRM reconfiguration to support the new stage definitions, reporting build-out, outbound infrastructure if applicable, and AI tooling aligned to the validated motion. The priority at Series B is usually CRM and forecasting before outbound — because the system needs to be trustworthy before it can be scaled.
The Diagnostic is a standalone engagement. Many Series B founders and CROs start there — especially when a new revenue leader has just joined and needs an independent view of the system before making changes.
Companies anonymised by request. Every number is real — context available on a call.
$22M ARR, Series B. Eight reps, eight different definitions of Commit. Rebuilt stage criteria and forecast cadence.
Read case study →$14M ARR. 4× pipeline coverage, revenue flat. Stage definitions were measuring rep activity. Fixed the evidence criteria.
Read case study →$9M ARR. ICP had drifted from operations to finance buyers. Realigned ICP and tightened qualification to fit.
Read case study →Post-Series B companies face a specific set of system challenges: the founder-led sales motion no longer scales, the ICP has drifted as the product evolved, revenue team roles are unclear, forecast volatility is increasing as deal complexity grows, and the board is demanding predictability the current system cannot produce. These are structural problems, not execution problems.
The GTM motion that worked at Seed and Series A is typically founder-led, intuition-driven, and relationship-dependent. At Series B, you are trying to replicate that motion across 15–30 people. The ICP needs to be defined and enforced — not just known intuitively. Stage criteria need to mean the same thing to every rep. Forecasting needs to be a system. The transition from motion to system is where most Series B companies stall.
The right time is when growth has plateaued despite the team executing, or when the board is asking questions the revenue team cannot confidently answer. Common triggers: a new CRO hire who needs an independent view before making changes, a missed quarter despite healthy-looking pipeline, or board pressure ahead of a Series C raise.
It depends on the gap. If the company lacks a CRO and needs ongoing senior revenue leadership, a fractional CRO makes sense. If the company has a CRO (or a VP of Sales acting in that role) but the revenue system needs to be diagnosed and redesigned, a GTM consultant is the right choice. GTM-360 runs defined engagements with clear deliverables — not an ongoing executive placement.
Stage and qualification changes typically show up in win rate and forecast accuracy within one to two quarters. Pipeline quality improvements are visible faster. ICP realignment takes two to three quarters to fully materialise as the pipeline rebuilds with better-fit opportunities. The Diagnostic phase produces an initial constraint diagnosis within 10–14 days.
10–14 days. Independent view of the constraint. Designed for Series B teams that need to know what's actually broken before changing anything.
Goes directly to a partner. Not a CRM queue.
Start with the diagnostic →